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Is extension an effective tool for increasing social welfare? The objective of this study is to evaluate 
the feasibility of farmer financial participation in extension as an alternative to increase its 
efficiency. While extension costs have been high, the impact at farmers’ welfare has not yielded the 
expected results. Rice production in Nigeria and Benin is used as a study case. Rice is an important 
food crop and cash crops and both countries have conditions to produce it locally. Two concepts 
are used to evaluate private participation: farmers’ capability to pay (CTP) and requirement to pay 
(RTP) for extension. Farmers’ capability to pay is evaluated from the expected increase benefit due 
to extension work. Requirement to pay is deducted from extension costs. Results show that rice 
farmers could initially contribute with 25% of the extension costs in Nigeria and 10% in Benin. 
While financial participation from farmers is a possibility, the role of the government is still needed 
to guarantee social welfare. 
 
 




Supporting Agricultural Extension: Could farmers contribute? 
1. Introduction 
Is extension an effective tool for increasing social welfare? Agricultural extension has been 
questioned due to its low effectiveness in improving farmers’ welfare (Carney 1998; Rivera and 
Zijp 2002; Chapman and Tripp 2003) in spite of the existence of extensive literature reporting high 
returns to agricultural extension investment (Birkhaeuser et al. 1991; Evenson 2001). The objective 
of this research is to evaluate the feasibility of farmer financial participation in extension as an 
alternative to increase efficiency. The objective of this study is to develop parameters for evaluating 
private participation in extension.  
In recent years, financial diversification in agricultural extension has received more 
attention. Rivera and Zijp (2002) described experiences on contracting for agricultural extension in 
countries as contrasting as Bangladesh, Chile, Estonia, Germany, Mali, Uganda, USA, and others. 
Katz (2002a), introduced the term financial participation to refer to any type of stakeholders 
payment for the extension services and presented 40 case studies around the world. Davidson and 
Ahmad (2003) have used the case of Pakistan to discuss privatization and the crisis of agricultural 
extension in this country. Experiences in various locations around the world (Schwartz 1994; 
Carney 1998; Chapman and Tripp 2003) are demonstrating that inefficiencies in resource allocation 
are unavoidable if a service such as extension is provided free of charge to stakeholders who might 
be able and/or willing to contribute to obtain appropriate service.  
Rice production in Nigeria and Benin is used as a case study to evaluate the feasibility of 
introducing financial participation in the extension system. Rice is a main staple and cash crop in 
both countries (Ahoyo Adjovi 1996; Akpokoje et al. 2003) however the public delivery of rice 
technologies has been inefficient, accentuated by elevated costs (Akpokoje et al. 2003). Countries 
with similar technology delivery problems have handed out extension services to private providers 
or have diversified funding (Carney 1998; Berdegué and Marchant 2002; Katz 2002b; Rivera and  
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Zijp 2002; Chapman and Tripp 2003; Davidson and Ahmad 2003). The conclusion in those 
countries has been the same. Although economic and social reasons justify public financing of 
agricultural extension services, not all services need to be publicly provided (Sulaiman and 
Sadamate 2000). 
We introduce two concepts to evaluate financial participation in agricultural extension: 
capability to pay (CTP) and requirement to pay (RTP). Capability to pay is evaluated from the 
expected increase benefit due to extension work. Requirement to pay is deducted from extension 
costs. Willingness to pay for extension is a concept that has more often been used to evaluate 
private provision of extension and is not part of this study.  
This study is based on a project initiated in 1999 by the West African Rice Development 
Association (now Africa Rice Center, WARDA)  and supported by the German Ministry of 
Economic Cooperation (GTZ/BEAF). The main goals of the project were to develop participatory 
tools that would enhance stakeholder participation in the rice technology development process and 
to explore alternative ways to increase the efficiency of agricultural extension.  
2. Site Description and Characterization 
The villages covered in this study are located in Kogi, Ogun, and Ebonyi states in Nigeria and in 
the department of Collines in Benin. Each key site has unique ecological, social and economic 
characteristics.  
a. Rice Farmers 
Farmers were identified in a two-step process. First, rice-growing villages were located with the 
help of agricultural extension officials. Next, farmers were called to community planning meetings 
and invited to participate in the project. A total of 272 farmers enrolled in the project activities, 176 
from Nigeria (57 in Kogi, 49 in Ogun and 70 in Ebonyi), and 96 from Benin (46 in Dassa and 50 in 
Glazoue). The primary data in this study came from three different sources. The first source was a 
household survey conducted during 2002 – 2003, addressed to each participatory farmer. The  
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survey covered general household characteristics, rice production, and market information.  The 
second source of information was on-farm trial experience. Each of the 272 farmers agreed to 
implement an on-farm trial during two cropping seasons to test an improved rice variety and 
compare it to the locally used variety. The last source of information comes from semi-structured 
interviews with rice producers, extension agents and agriculture authorities. Statistical data on rice 
prices and agricultural extension expenditure were collected from official institutions in Nigeria and 
Benin. Finally, financial information about the WARDA project was used to complement 
estimations. 
b. Rice Production 
The Institute National de Recherche Agronomique du Bénin (INRAB) and the Nigerian Cereal 
Research Institute (NCRI) have been working with the Africa Rice Center (WARDA) in 
collaborative projects for increasing the productivity of rice. The national agricultural research 
system is not effective in adapting the technologies to local conditions and in producing enough 
seed to satisfy the demand. In the case of rice seed, the availability of improved commercial seed is 
very limited although there is demand for them. The public sector is not able to adapt the 
improved lines and reproduced them at commercial levels.  
c. Agricultural Extension 
Agricultural extension in West African countries is being carried out since the mid 1980’s. 
It was designed and supported by the World Bank (Shaib et al. 1998) and is based on the Training 
and Visit (T&V) system. T&V is a transfer of technology model, an expensive top down approach 
that works under the assumption that farmers lack adequate knowledge that restrains productions 
increase. T & V concentrates on the transfer of scientific agricultural knowledge and technology 
from research institutions to farmers. Even though there have been efforts to replace the system, 
this scheme still persists in the extension strategy of the Agricultural Development Program (ADP) 
in charge of the extension services in Nigeria (Idowu 1988). Similar development of extension  
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services happened in Benin, where CARDER (Centre d’Accion Regional pour le Developpement 
Rural) is the institution in charge of agricultural extension (von der Lühe 1991). The main criticism 
to this extension approach is the most crucial one: the system is not cost effective or financially 
sustainable. 
3. Capability to Pay for Extension Services 
The concept of “capability to pay” (CTP) is introduced to evaluate how the extension service could 
increase farmer’s welfare. The benefit from the extension activity has to be perceived by the 
farmers in a direct way, not only to increase the incentives to pay for extension, but also to make 
farmers able to pay for the service. In this study CTP for extension is derived from the expected 
increase in rice gross margins (GM) due to extension work. There are two main assumptions 
behind the GM estimation: a) improved rice varieties have higher yield performance in the field 
compared to local varieties; b) the rate of input use remains constant; c) adoption is monotonic. 
Total revenues are estimated from the total production at the farm gate price. Total variable costs 
include the costs of seed, fertilizer and total labor cost. Opportunity cost of the inputs was 
estimated at 10% of the variable costs. GM results (Table 1) show that rice production is a 
profitable activity in all the sites but small production areas are the main constraint to larger 
benefits specifically in Benin. The highest net returns were recorded in Dassa (3.34) and Glazoue 
(2.59) mainly due to a large average yield, however the average rice areas in both Benin sites are 
relatively small.  
New technology (improved rice seed) delivered by the extension system could impact GM 
in two main ways, increasing productivity and thus total revenues or decreasing input use or total 
costs. In this study we are dealing with the first case. Although farmers’ preferences can be 
different from scientific breeding priorities, high yield is an expected attribute in any improved 
variety. On the other hand, yield improvement alone it is not sufficient to affect farmers’ decision 
to adopt a variety (Dalton 2004).  Table 2 presents GMs estimations at two different scenarios with 
yield increase of 10 and 20% due to the adoption of the technology. Assuming than the production  
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costs are unaffected by the use of the improved technology, the scenario cases show that a 20% 
increase in yield would imply at least a GM increase of 32% (Kogi, Glazoue). In monetary terms 
this can be translated to about US$ 44 increase (Dassa).  
For farmers in Nigeria a 10% yield increase due to extension would be at least US$ 
22/household (Kogi), while in Benin, this value would be at least US$ 23/household (see Glazoue 
Table 3). A certain percentage of the GM increase can be used to pay for the extension services. 
Farmers’ CTP fixed at 10% of GM increase could be a conservative amount to pay for such 
extension services. Notice that the extension agent would need to diversify activities or have 
additional sources of income. Extension exclusively for one crop does not seem sensible, especially 
for a food crop like rice. 
In Nigeria, at 10% yield increases the CTP values are at least equal or higher than US$ 0.83 
(Ogun state). These values doubled under the 20% yield increase scenario. In Benin, the CTP 
values were considerably lower due to the smaller rice area, US$ 0.25 in Dassa and US$ 0.17 in 
Glazoue with a 10% yield increase. The ability to pay is constrained by the rice cropping area and 
thus by the low profit obtained from rice production. While GMs are at the same level in Benin as 
in Nigeria, the benefit cost ratios are higher in Benin. Rice cropping in Benin is then a possible 
source of income. Moreover farmers interviewed in this country sell at least 50% (Glazoue) of their 
harvest, evidencing an important link to the market through this crop. 
4. Requirement to Pay for Extension Services 
An extension system based on private contributions requires a minimum participation in order to 
keep operating. In this concept not only farmers’ interest are involved but also extension agents’ 
and the government’s, and the interest of any other stakeholder willing to participate and benefit 
from the system. Dinar and Keynan (2001) evaluated economic performance of paid extension in 
Nicaragua. These authors have compared the performance of paid and public extension services at 
four levels: farmers, extension agent, government and the society. In the study the farmers were  
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considered net benefit maximizers, the extension agent or agency profit maximizers or cost 
minimizers, the government was seeking costs-effectiveness, while the society was expected at least 
to do the same or more with fewer resources. In a reduced model the main utilities involved are the 
farmers’, the extension agents’ and government utilities. Welfare of these actors is often in conflict, 
making social welfare a difficult goal to attain.  
Rice farmers were involved in an on-farm trial activity where they have the chance to 
compare the performance of their local rice with the performance of an improved variety. 
Furthermore, farmers were advised and monitored by a WARDA extension agent. The salary of 
the extension agent was paid by WARDA and it was equivalent to US$100, which is above the 
salary offer by the local extension system. Each extension agent was in charge of an average of 25 
to 30 farmers. The seed and fertilizer was provided as well by WARDA. The size of the 
experimental plot was 20 x 50 m where half of the area was dedicated to the improved variety and 
the other half to the local one. The visits to the plot were periodical and the extension agents had 
to report specific rice performance information to WARDA. The main variables to determine 
different contribution levels of the government (public sector) and the farmer (private sector) were 
extension agent salary and the number of farmers assisted. Extension cost per farmer can be: 
decreasing or constant, depending on the change of extension agent salary with respect to the 
change of the number of farmers assisted.  
a. Constant Extension Costs 
In the first case scenario the initial monthly salary of the extension agent was fixed to US$ 100, 
while the number of farmers assisted and the level of contribution assumed different values (Table 
4). The ratio of the salary of the extension agent to the number of farmers assisted is the cost of 
extension per farmer, or the RTP per farmer. This cost of extension is covered partly by the farmer 
and partly by the government. The farmer’s contribution varies from 10% of the total extension 
cost per farmer to 100%. The government level of contribution takes the complementary values, 
from 90% coverage to 0% coverage. Note that individual farmer contributions decrease and  
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government cost effectiveness improves with the number of farmers assisted. On the other hand, 
the number of farmers reached by the extension agent does not affect his salary; however, the 
efficiency could be harmed if the same agent covers too many farmers. At the same time the only 
incentive for the extension agent is a better than average salary. 
Under this financing model the CTP of US$ 0.83/month/farmer (assuming a 10% yield 
increase due to the extension work) makes farmers’ contribution feasible. At a 10% level of 
farmers’ contribution the RTP values are all below the CTP for Nigerian farmers who could 
contribute up to 25% of the extension costs.  In Benin the CTP constraining values are much 
lower than in Nigeria, allowing farmers with a 20% yield increase to contribute only to 10% of the 
total costs.  
b. Decreasing Extension Costs  
The contribution estimations that result from this scenario are alike to the previous case; however 
in terms of welfare this is a more favorable situation for all the stakeholders. On one hand since the 
extension costs decrease with the number of farmers assisted, the cost effectiveness of the 
government increase. On the other hand, the extension agent incentives are higher because his 
salary increases with the number of farmers assisted (Table 5).  
As in the previous case, Nigerian farmers’ CTP  is comparable to the farmers’ RTP when 
farmers are paying at least 25% of the total extension costs. In Benin only a yield increase of 20% 
could improve the CTP of the rice farmer (US$ 0.24) enough to be able to contribute but bearing 
no more than 10% of the costs, at least at an initial stage. In this situation extension agents are 
encouraged to have a better performance and cover more farmers. The government is cost 
effective and farmers’ contribution decrease with more farmers participating. However, too many 
farmers assisted by only one extension agent would have a negative impact on the system. While 
this can be seen as a perfect scenario there is a need to balance extension costs and coverage. If 
there is no limit on the number of farmers covered by the extension agent, farmers’ welfare and  
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extension agents’ efficiency could decrease. Also note that total extension cost actually increases for 
the government.  
5. Private Participation Feasibility 
In theory, to keep the incentives for a paid extension system farmer’s ability to pay should be at 
least equal or higher than the requirement: CTP > RTP. In practice, paid agricultural extension is 
not an idea that can be easily sold to risk avers farmers in West Africa. Independently of the crop 
the idea of paying for a service, so far publicly rendered, needs time to be accepted. The 
probabilities that small farmers in the study area could finance 100% of the costs without a form of 
government support are small. Even in a country like Chile and after more than 2 decades of 
privatized extension, the government still allocates public resources to pay 85 to 90% of the total 
extension costs (Berdegué and Marchant 2002).  
RTP values estimated for Benin and Nigeria are well below similar estimations done for 
other conditions (Perraton et al. 1983 in Malawi; Dinar 1996 in Israel; Currle et al. 2002 in 
Thuringia; Schmidt 2005 in Romania). In Nigeria, data from 1997 indicate that under the T&V 
system only 6.5% of the families in Kogi; 4.4% in Ogun and 1.3% in Ebonyi had direct access to 
extension (Federal Agricultural Development Program 1999). While the cost of covering these 
households ranged from US$ 8.86 in Kogi to US$ 11.70 in Ebonyi and US$ 33.30 in Ogun. It is 
difficult to make a direct comparison among these values, since they have been estimated based on 
other conditions and with other assumptions. These are real extension costs that are not limited to 
a commodity; however the estimations do help to envisage how expensive the extension service 
could be and how much government support it still needs to keep operating.  
Agricultural extension has to offer real technological advantages to have this level of 
contributions. Increasing the low rice yields in study areas might not seem an onerous task but it 
should not be taken for granted either. There are serious constrains to rice production 
independently of rice quality and yield, like bird attacks in Ogun, or high labor demand in Benin,  
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that have induced the move from this crop to less labor demanding ones. Rice is just the example 
crop used in this study. Paid extension service could not be sustainable based on only this crop.  
As Dinar (1996) argues, the production of certain crops could not pay for the service. 
Certain agricultural growers, predominantly small holders, would not be able to afford the service 
which is also the case for the small rice farmers in the study areas, mainly in Benin. Note that the 
average rice area per household is below a hectare in Dassa and Glazoue. Commercialized 
extension would probably need to be more diversified and provide different packages of services to 
different client groups.  Estimated contributions of 25% of the extension costs in Nigeria and 10% 
in Benin are still acceptable, at least for initial stages.  
6. Role of the Government 
As Hite states (1993), it is not possible to make any definite statement about the efficiency 
implications of any specific privatization without knowing all the costs, including those implicit in 
the political trades. Nevertheless agricultural policy environment is changing to adapt to global 
political and economical trends. Under this changing environment, there are several driving forces 
pushing for privatization. In fact, evidence of high social and private return to R&D support the 
view that society is investing too little in agricultural R&D (Alston et al. 1999). Then it is the 
governments’ responsibility to create conditions for private participation and avoid market failures.  
Private extension does not necessarily reduce the public role, but allows a better priority 
setting. Training of extension agents could be a public task under the conditions in both Benin and 
Nigeria. Professional competence of extension agents is a must for any extension system 
improvement. The vast majority of extension workers begin their careers in the field with a weak 
knowledge of agricultural science and limited skills in extension communication (SAA 2005). 
Despite their first-hand experience with farmers and farming they are usually underpaid. Another 
important government task would be to deal with finding an answer to the question of what are the 
prospects for developing institutions that favor small resource-poor farmers. If private extension  
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actually happens in either of these two countries small farmers would probably be affected or 
neglected by these services.  
The nature of agricultural extension required to overcome the rice market problems is 
neither completely public nor completely private. Local conditions like long distances, low 
education of farmers and the presence of different ethnic groups create excludability and thus 
conditions for private participation. The complexity of rice production, small rice areas. and the 
low demand for local rice hamper the incentives for private investment. Extension in the case of 
rice must then be a public task, but financial participation from farmers is still a possibility.  
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Table 1 Rice gross margins (US$/Ha) 
Component Units  Kogi Ogun Ebonyi  Dassa  Glazoue
Total Revenue (TR)  US$ / Ha 220.00 300.16 244.45 406.93  232.754
- Survey based yield  kg / Ha  1.280.00 1130.00 1490.00  2352.00  1345.40
- Retail price  US$ / kg 0.17 0.27 0.16  0.17  0.17
Total Variable Cost (TVC)  US$ / Ha 86.18 152.69 141.25 121.96  89.95
- Seed  US$ / Ha 12.75 22.56 19.69  16.76  14.55
- Fertilizer  US$ / Ha 0.00 0.00 17.58  0.00  0.00
- Hired Labor   US$ / Ha 69.98 124.02 98.34  98.47  70.44
- Interest working capital (10%)   US$ / Ha 3.45 6.11 5.65  6.72  4.96
Gross Margin (TR – TVC)  US$ / Ha 133.82 147.47 103.20 284.97 142.81
Total Production Cost / kg  US$ / kg 0.07 0.14 0.09 0.05 0.07
Benefit- Cost Ratio    2.55 1.97 1.73 3.34 2.59
 
Table 2 Rice gross margins at different yields increases 
 





















Kogi  133.82  155.82 22.00  16.44  177.82 44.00  32.88 
Ogun  147.47  177.49 30.02  20.35  207.50 60.03  40.71 
Ebonyi  91.56  114.84 23.28  25.43  138.12 46.56  50.85 
Dassa  284.97  325.67 40.69  14.28  366.36 81.39  28.56 
Glazoue  142.81  166.08 23.28  16.30  189.36 46.55  32.60 
 
Table 3 CTP estimations at different level of yield increase 






















Kogi  2.26 5  22.00 9.94 0.99  44.00  19.89  1.99 
Ogun  1.39 5  30.02 8.34 0.83  60.03  16.69  1.67 
Ebonyi  2.87 5  23.28 13.36 1.34 46.56 26.73  2.67 
Dassa  0.31 5  40.69 2.52 0.25  81.39 5.04  0.50 
Glazoue  0.36 5  23.28 1.68 0.17  46.55 3.35  0.33 
* Benefit/month is related to the average rice area in each site 




Table 4 Scenario 1 – RTP per farmer with constant extension costs 
RTP (US$) 







10% 90%  25% 75%  50%  50% 100%  0% 
100 25  0.40 3.60  1.00 3.00  2.00  2.00  4.00  0.00 
100 30  0.33 3.00  0.83 2.50  1.67  1.67  3.33  0.00 
100 35  0.29 2.57  0.71 2.14  1.43  1.43  2.86  0.00 
100 40  0.25 2.25  0.63 1.88  1.25  1.25  2.50  0.00 
 
Table 5 Scenario 2 – RTP per farmer with decreasing extension costs 
RTP (US$) 






10% 90% 25% 75% 50% 50%  100% 0% 
100 25  0.40 3.60 1.00 3.00 2.00 2.00  4.00 0.00 
115 30  0.38 3.45 0.96 2.88 1.92 1.92  3.83 0.00 
130 35  0.37 3.34 0.93 2.79 1.86 1.86  3.71 0.00 
145 40  0.36 3.26 0.91 2.72 1.81 1.81  3.63 0.00 
 